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et al.: United States
Trust
Co. of New York v. Town of Ramapo799
(decided July 3, 1996)
DUE
PROCESS

SUPREME COURT
ROCKLAND COUNTY
3 18
United States Trust Co. of New York v. Town of Ramapo
(decided July 3, 1996)

Plaintiff, United States Trust Company of 'New York, as
mortgagee, sought a declaratory judgment against Defendant, the
State of New York, to hold the Board of Appeals of the Town of
Ramapo [hereinafter referred to as "Town"] liable for failing to
provide actual notice of the hearing for a demolition permit. The
plaintiff alleged that the Town's failure to provide actual notice
of a hearing regarding a demolition permit violated both the
Federal3 19 and New York State320 Constitutional guarantees of
Due Process. 32 1 Procedural due process requires a process
whereby the parties, whose rights are to be affected, are entitled
to be heard. 322 The New York State Supreme Court, Rockland
County, held that due process, pursuant to federal and state law,
requires more than constructive notice for a variance application
where the Town Zoning Board of Appeals intended to grant the
application for demolition of the building on the property to an
entity, as opposed to the owner of the property. 323 Subsequently,
the Supreme Court found the demolition permit "void ab
318. 168 Misc. 2d 931, 645 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct, Rockland County
1996).
319. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... " Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: " [N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law... . " Id.

320. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
321. U.S. Trust, 168 Misc. 2d at 932, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
322. Id. at 933, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
323. Id. at 935, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 398-99.
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initio.' ' 324 Plaintiffs application for summary judgment,
however, was denied because the issue could not be determined
325
based upon the papers that the plaintiff submitted.
Plaintiff held a mortgage on property located in Monsey, New
York. 326 The mortgage was executed when the property was
32 7
certified as a one-family home located on one-third of an acre.
Defendant, not the owner of record of the property, applied to
the Town to build a house of worship on the property. 32 8
Defendant, who was denied the application, sought a variance
and advised the Zoning Board that "the existing building would
have to be demolished" prior to erecting a new building. 329 The
Zoning Board sent notice to neighboring property owners through
the mail, posted a notice on the premises and placed notice in the
local newspaper regarding the variance. 330 Subsequently the
variance granting demolition, was issued. 331 The one-family
house was then demolished and construction began on the house
of worship. 332 Plaintiff, however, contended that "the Town's
method of giving notice was insufficient to [provide] proper
notice to a mortgagee[,]" thereby substantially impairing the
mortgagee's security interest in the property.333
324. Id. at 935, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 399 (noting that the town's failure to
notify plaintiff of the hearing deprived plaintiff of an opportunity to be heard,
therefore, the demolition permit was declared "void ab initio"). "Void ab
initio" is defined as "[n]ull from the beginning if it seriously offends law or
public policy in contrast to a contract which is merely voidable at the election

of one of the parties to the contract." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (6th ed.
1990).

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

U.S. Trust, 168 Misc. 2d at 935, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
Id. at 932, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
Id.
Id.
Id.

330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. (finding that proper notice would have given the plaintiff an
opportunity to be heard regarding his security interest in building on the

premises. Instead, the plaintiff was never given notice and was thus deprived
of his security interest. The plaintiff, without proper notice, was unaware of
the demolition permit regarding land on which plaintiff had a security interest.
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The court began its analysis by stating that the Due Process
Clause of both the Federal and New York State Constitutions
require, prior to an action that will affect a property interest
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
334
Amendment, a state to provide notice of the pending action.
The notice requirement must convey the required information and
afford the interested parties reasonable time to make an
appearance. 335 In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Conany,336 the United States Supreme Court embraced a
standard: "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is
notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections." 337 Notice may
be satisfied in various ways but it "[m]ust be of such nature as
reasonably to convey the required information ...and it must
afford a reasonable time for those interested parties to make their
appearance."338 If this standard is met, then the constitutional
requirement of due process is satisfied.
In Mullane, publication, which had traditionally been accepted
as notice, was found insufficient to inform the necessary parties
This court, therefore, went against the norm requiring more than constructive
notice).
334. U.S. Trust, 168 Misc. 2d at 933, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
335. Id.
336. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
337. Id. at 314 (citations omitted). In Mullane, the Supreme Court
emphasized the requirement that parties be notified of proceedings affecting
their legally protected interests. Id. The general rule, as set out in Mullane.
states that notice by publication is insufficient with respect to a person whose
identity is easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interest is affected
by the proceeding. Id. See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385. 394 (1914)
(stating that notice is a vital corollary to the fundamental requisite of due
process - the right to be heard). The Supreme Court of Rockland County
followed this standard in its decision. See U.S. Trust, 168 Misc. 2d at 933. 645
N.Y.S.2d at 397. See also Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112
(1956).
338. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citations omitted). See also Goodrich v.
Ferris, 214 U.S. 71 (1909) (finding that the requirement of notice is of no

value unless it is for an adequate purpose).
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of the pending action. 339 Notice by publication is inadequate

because it is not reasonably calculated to inform interested parties
who can be notified by other more effective means. 340 The court
concluded that a publication and a posting are insufficient to
provide notice when the owner's identity is ascertainable from
public records. 34 1 However, where the person is missing or

unknown, and it is not possible or practicable to give a more
adequate warning, publication is adequate notice. 342 In Mullane,
publication was sufficient because it was the best notice
practicable
when
the
beneficiaries'
locality
was
343
unascertainable.
A mortgagee has a protected property right
and is entitled to actual notice. 344 Notice by publication, though

sometimes effective, is not likely to forewarn a mortgagee of a
345

pending proceeding.
In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 34 6 the Supreme

Court held, without listing what types of notice are acceptable
and adequate, that notice by mail, which ensures actual notice,

"is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which
will

adversely

affect

the ...

property

interests

of

any

339. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 320.
340. Id. at 316.
341. Id. at 318. See also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208
(1962). The general rule, followed by Schroeder and taken from Mullane, is
that "[niotice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose
name and address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally
protected interests are directly affected by the proceedings in question." Id. at
212-13.
342. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
343. Id.
344. U.S. Trust Co. v. Ramapo, 168 Misc. 2d 931, 935, 645 N.Y.S.2d
396, 398 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1996).
345. See Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798
(1983). The Court held that constructive notice to a mortgagee, whose identity
may be ascertained through public records, does not satisfy the due process
requirement as set forth in Mullane. Id. at 798-99. "Neither notice by
publication and posting, nor mailed notice to the property owner are [proper]."
Id at 799. "Personal service or mailed notice is required ..... "Id.
346. 462 U.S. 791 (1983). The Mennonite court concluded that neither
publication nor posting is reasonably calculated to inform interested parties
who can be notified by more effective means. Id. at 798-99.
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party .... ",347 The Mennonite court concluded that mailed
notices to a property owner, including a posting in local
newspaper and courthouse, was insufficient to deprive a
mortgagee of his interest in the property sold. 3 4 8 People who
have an interest in property are often unlikely to be reached by
means of notice by publication and posting. 3 4 9 Such methods of

notice, therefore, are unreasonable when more reasonable and
inexpensive alternatives are available. 35 0 The Mennonite court

concluded that a mortgagee has a substantial property interest and
is therefore entitled to notice that is reasonably calculated to
35 1
apprise it of the event.

New York State courts adhere to the rules for notification
mandated by the United States Supreme Court. 3 5 2 In 1993, the
New York Real Property Tax Law [hereinafter "RPTL"] 3 5 3 was
re-codified to include a notice provision. 3 54 The notice provision
requires notice to be mailed to a mortgagee, and to any other

person whose property interest may be affected by the pending
proceeding. 3 5 5 Prior to this amendment to the RPTL, notice by
347. Id. at 800.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 799.
350. Id. See N.Y. TowN LAw § 267-a(7) (McKinney 1996). This section
provides, in pertinent part, that the Board of Appeals procedure includes:
Hearing on appeal. The board of appeals shall fix a reasonable time for
the hearing of the appeal or other matter referred to it and give public
notice of such hearing by publication in a paper of general circulation in
the town at least five days prior to the date thereof ....
Id.
351. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 799.
352. Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 213. See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352
U.S. 112 (1956) In Walker, the appellant's land was taken in a condemnation
proceeding where notice was given only by publication in a local newspaper.
Id. at 115-16. The Court held that such notice was constitutionally insufficient
because the appellant's identity could have been ascertained through public
records. Id. at 116.
353. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAWv § 1125 (effective January 1, 1995, as
amended) (McKinney 1995) (stating that notice is to be mailed to each owner
and any other person whose right, title or interest is a matter of public record).
354. Id.
355. Id.
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356
publication was the only notice given to a mortgagee.
Constructive notice, given prior to the amendment, was deemed
unconstitutional
and in violation
of the Fourteenth
357
Amendment.
The amendment to the RPTL reflects the ruling
in McCann v. Scaduto,358 wherein the New York State Court of
Appeals concluded that notice by publication and posting, which
is unlikely to reach all those who have an interest in the property,
is insufficient. 359 A town's use of such indirect methods of notice
is not reasonable when other inexpensive and more efficient
alternatives, such as personal delivery, exist. 360 Where the
interest of a property owner will be substantially affected by an
act of the government, and where the affected party is
36 1
ascertainable, due process requires that actual notice be given.
The plaintiff, as a mortgagee with a property interest, has an
interest in any governmental action that may affect the
premises. 362 The court found, however, that the plaintiff was not
irrevocably deprived of his property interest unless there had
been a tax sale or condemnation proceeding. 363 The plaintiff's
security interest, however, was substantially impaired by the

356. U.S. Trust v. Ramapo, 168 Misc. 2d 931, 933-34 645 N.Y.S.2d 396,
397-98 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1996).
357. Id. See Cooper v. Makela, 629 F. Supp. 658 (W.D.N.Y. 1986)
(holding that constructive notice to mortgagees does not fulfill the notice
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment).
358. 71 N.Y.2d 164, 519 N.E.2d 309, 524 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1987). Petitioner
lost her residence because of unpaid taxes. Id. at 171, 519 N.E.2d at 311, 524
N.Y.S.2d at 400. No notice was furnished regarding the tax lien sale. Id.
Further, the property owner was afforded no right to a hearing. Id. at 172, 519
N.E.2d at 311, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 400. The court followed Mullane and held
that publication was inadequate notice. Id. at 174, 519 N.E.2d at 313, 524
N.Y.S.2d at 402. The court found that failure to provide property owners with
actual notice of tax lien sale was a deprivation of due process. Id. at 176, 519
N.E.2d at 314, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
359. Id. at 175, 519 N.E.2d at 314, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. U.S. Trust v. Ramapo, 168 Misc. 2d 931, 934 645 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398
(Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1996).
363. Id.
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demolition of the home on the premises. 364 Although the Town
argued that there was no substantial deprivation or impairment to
the plaintiff, the building was demolished with the Town's
approval and mere constructive notice was given to the
mortgagee. 365 The U.S. Trust court stated that although the
mortgagee has a security interest in the property which may
exceed that of the owner, mere deprivation in value would not
support a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Substantial deprivation,
366
however, would give rise to a Fourteenth Amendment claim.
The U.S. Trust court acknowledged that the Town did not have
to provide notice of every minute detail. 367 The burden of notice,
however, is not excused by the municipality's taking "reasonable
steps to provide actual notice." 368 "When a [town] ... intends
to grant an application ...to an entity who is not the owner of
the property, to demolish the sole and primary building on the
property, due process requires more than constructive notice to
the mortgagee." 369 There is no additional burden on the town to
identify the mortgagee and provide notice by mail concerning the
application for the hearing on the demolition than there would be
to provide such notice of a tax lien sale. 370 Furthermore, the
U.S. Trust court found that notice by posting and publication was
inadequate and failed to comply with due process
requirements. 3 7 1 The Town's failure to properly notify the
plaintiff of the hearing deprived the plaintiff of (1) an opportunity
to be heard, and (2) the former building on the premises. 372 The

364. Id. at 934, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 398 (stating that "[t]he demolition of the
entire building on the property is not akin to a mere decline in property, which
would not support a Fourteenth Amendment deprivation claim ...but

constitutes a very substantial impairment of plaintiffs security interest").
365. Id. at 935, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Anthony v. Town of Brookhaven, 190 A.D.2d 21. 27. 596 N.Y.S.2d
459, 462 (2d Dep't 1993).

369. U.S. Trust, 168 Misc. 2d at 935, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
370. Id. at 935, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 398-99.
371. Id., 645 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
372. Id.
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court, therefore, concluded that "[tihe demolition permit is thus
373
declared null and void ab initio."
The court in Walker stated that notice by publication is
inadequate when one's identity may be easily ascertained through
public records. New York courts have adopted the rule
enunciated in the Mullane case via Walker.374 A town must give
a mortgagee notice that a building may be demolished. 375
Although the plaintiff mortgagee was unknown to the town, the
plaintiffs identity could have been ascertained by means of
public records. Therefore, publication was inadequate notice and,
as such, constituted a violation of the plaintiff's due process
rights.376

373.
374.
375.
376.

Id.
See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
U.S. Trust, 168 Misc. 2d at 935, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 398-99.
Id.
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